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Lord: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS
The story of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s is a well-known one, at
least in khaki circles, but for many it has receded into an iconic past that seems to
hold few obvious lessons for the present. In “Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today,” John Hanley asks us to revisit the context and
development of the original, Soviet-inspired Maritime Strategy in the light of the
challenge currently posed to the United States and its allies by the People’s Republic of China. The primary focus of his discussion is the role of the Chief of Naval
Operations’ Strategic Studies Group (SSG) as catalyst of the strategy. Writing as
one intimately familiar with this organization and those then associated with it,
many of whom would occupy very senior positions in the Navy in later years,
Hanley emphasizes the critical importance of the SSG not only in effective exploitation of sensitive intelligence on the Soviet navy (by now a relatively well-known
part of the story) but also in conceptual breakthroughs in combined-arms antisubmarine operations and in what later came to be called “net-centric warfare.”
He suggests that a group with the attributes of the SSG (collocated with the Naval
War College but working more or less directly for the Chief of Naval Operations)
might profitably refocus its efforts to concentrate on developing imaginative
strategic counters to the near-term Chinese threat to American global maritime
operations. John Hanley, a former Navy nuclear submarine officer, served on the
Strategic Studies Group for eighteen years, eventually as deputy director.
Central to Chinese maritime preoccupations in the twenty-first century is
certain to be the South China Sea. For some years, China has advanced a vague
claim to “sovereignty” over a large swath of that strategic body of water (the
“nine-dotted line”). More recently, it has tried in various ways to strengthen its
hold on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, ownership of which remains contested
with several Southeast Asia nations (as well as Taiwan), and has attempted to exert greater control over fisheries there and the transit of foreign shipping. James
R. Holmes, in “Strategic Features of the South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood
for Hegemons,” offers an analysis of the region that takes its point of departure
from the geopolitical writings of the great American naval strategist Alfred
Thayer Mahan. Specifically, Holmes argues that Mahan’s analysis of the significance of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean for the maritime security of the
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century provides a useful template
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for understanding China’s relationship to the South China Sea today and in the
future. His conclusion is that China’s geostrategic position there is weaker than
many may be inclined to think.
One of the most important mechanisms for keeping the peace in East Asia
is the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Its importance for the United States is all
the greater given the steady buildup of Chinese naval and maritime capabilities
in the region that we have witnessed in recent years. In “The Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force in the Age of Multilateral Cooperation: Nontraditional Security,” Captain Takuya Shimodaira, JMSDF, argues that Japan needs to ramp
up maritime cooperation with friendly navies, above all with that of the United
States, by a new emphasis on the conduct of what he terms “Noncombat Military
Operations,” particularly humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Captain
Shimodaira is currently the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Liaison Officer
to the Naval War College.
In “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain,” Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak provide a synoptic overview of an increasingly
important topic on the global security agenda. They adopt a middle position
between those of alarmists and skeptics concerning the potential of “cybered
conflict” (a term they seek to introduce) to be a “game changer”—that is, to have
a truly strategic impact—in the future security environment. Paying particular
attention to the evolution of cyber capabilities in the Navy, they hold out hope
that properly developed cyber forces can serve to maintain or enhance traditional
American military advantages. Peter Dombrowski and Chris Demchak are professors in the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies.
Also high on the current global security agenda is the issue of piracy. Christopher Spearin, in “Promising Privateers? Understanding the Constraints of Contemporary Private Security at Sea,” provides a careful discussion of the nature and
role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) today in addressing the
threat of piracy, particularly in the waters off Somalia. He argues that it is misleading to understand these entities, as many have suggested, as analogous to the
privateers of earlier centuries. Many questions remain to be answered, however,
concerning their relationship to national navies and authorities. Christopher
Spearin is a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada.
Finally, Marcus O. Jones, in “Innovation for Its Own Sake: The Type XXI
U-boat,” offers a fascinating case study in naval technological innovation in
wartime. He argues that the introduction of an entirely new submarine design
by Nazi Germany in 1943, often understood as reflecting the German obsession
later in the war with technological “wonder weapons” that would compensate
for strategic and tactical weaknesses, was instead a reasonable gamble that
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acknowledged the growing ineffectiveness of the Nazi U-boat effort in the teeth
of superior American and British countermeasures. However, he also notes that
it represented a poor allocation of resources by the German high command and
that it made no difference in the outcome of the war.
OUR LATEST NEWPORT PAPER
Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755–2009, Newport Paper 40, edited
by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, of the Naval War College, is now available in print for online sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office, at bookstore
.gpo.gov. This, our latest monograph (also available on our own website) collects
expert analyses of commerce raiding during the past two centuries in terms of the
factors of time, space, and force, as well as with respect to positive and negative
objectives. A consideration of the range of historical case studies in this volume
provides an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which old and long-forgotten
problems might reemerge to challenge future naval planners and strategists.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335,
309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
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